|
Author |
Thread Statistics | Show CCP posts - 0 post(s) |
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
16
|
Posted - 2015.10.21 22:09:00 -
[1] - Quote
OK, officer weapons were too prolific, so we've stemmed the supply faucet by modding warbarges. Great.
This creates value for Joe Newbro who gets an officer weapon salvage drop, because the market value of that weapon will be increased as a result of the warbarge nerf. On the other hand, the value's also decreased by the alternate supply source - stockpilers with huge inventories of officer weapons who are benefiting greatly for having taken advantage of a poorly implemented system (at no fault of their own).
The biggest problem this creates is an anti-progressive and imbalanced consolidation of power in the hands of older/more established/wealthy players at the expense of newbros. This in itself is not necessarily a problem, but that it was exacerbated by a poorly implemented system over a relatively short period of time does seem to merit some sort of corrective action.
What can be done that reduces the proliferation of officer weapons in stockpiles without punishing those that invested into the ill-advised warbarge officer farm?
Government buyback, that's what.
Officer weapons trading currently takes places at relatively stable and ascertainable price points. If CCP positions itself as a buyback purchaser at attractive pricepoints (maybe market +5-10%, or market + bonus for bulk sales) then it becomes a more attractive purchaser than market buyers. It then decommissions the weapons its purchased, further reducing supply on the market. Once market supply is at an appropriate spot (i.e. officer weapons are rare again), CCP pulls out of the market and lets laissez faire economics take hold again.
This will have an inflationary effect on the market as a whole, but 1) I think ISK inflation/proliferation is better than officer weapon proliferation, and 2) the reduced supply of weapons and increased supply of ISK will make it that much more beneficial for newbros who get officer weapon drops and sell them on the market (a progressive solution to counter the anti-progressive problem, as ISK value is greater to those who have less of it).
What do you guys think? This isn't necessarily the solution, but could it help? Why or why not?
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
16
|
Posted - 2015.10.21 22:30:00 -
[2] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:If CCP offered more ISK as a buyer than the current market does, the market would adjust to remain competitive.
Exactly - the market adjustment you mention refers to buyers, who must PAY MORE to be competitive with CCP as a buyer. This means CCP will alwyas be the buyer of choice (which is what we want, to create a weapons sink), and makes it more likely that non-stockpiler sellers have a healthier, more profitable market in which to sell their officer weapons obtained by means other than the warbarge. As the prices continue to rise, they'll eventually reach the point where private buyers are unwilling to keep up with CCP's prices, at which point the price stabilizes and the sink is positioned perfectly (i.e. in natural harmony with the market/buyers' willingness to 'keep up').
I like this idea, too, although it comes with its own set of deficiencies, as does mine. As I alluded to, the solution is likely to be a combination of several ideas - most of the time, hitting a target from multiple angles is more likely to yield a better result.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.21 23:01:00 -
[3] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:So CCP will have to keep updating their buyback price to remain competitive? This is a pretty dangerous path to go down as it adds another force to the market that is guaranteed to move it up. For every person buying officer gear there's a person selling it and generating ISK off it. ISK is already meaningless to enough players, let's not add to that.
Shaun, you're supporting my argument. Market prices for officer gear SHOULD go up. They're currently undervalued due to oversaturation. They WILL go up, due to the recent removal of a supply source. This isn't dangerous - it's both inevitable and good. And as I mentioned in my last post, the price will stabilize at the natural point where the market is unwilling to follow CCP upward in price. Did you read that post?
As for ISK - yes, it's less valuable to the ISK wealthy than to the ISK poor. This is the immutable nature of wealth. A dollar is more valuable to he that has only one than to he that has one million. As a player that's closer to the ISK floor than the ceiling, let me tell you - if officer weapon prices go up, I'll be happy. The drops I get from salvage will sell for more, and I'll be able to maybe start dipping my toes into the proto market, which right now is uncomfortably out of my price range for sustainable use.
Yes, any ISK inflation/saturation is unfortunate if not properly sunk (a big part of any sustainable MMO's economics has to do with controlling currency spigots and drains as a necessary counterweight to the artificiality of spontaneous asset generation), but in one sense it's ALREADY BEEN DONE through the proliferation of officer weapons, and I'm just speaking about converting from one inflation (weapons) to a less unacceptable one (ISK), and in another sense it's at least a progressive inflation, in that it harms the poor less than it harms the wealthy.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.21 23:21:00 -
[4] - Quote
maybe deadcatz wrote:What if newbros have a higher drop rate of gear till they reach certain skill point levels and loyalty ranks then it drops sharply. What, no. More officer gear isn't needed in ANYONE'S hand, newbs or vets. We're oversaturated. We need less officer gear.
maybe deadcatz wrote:OR.
make it so selling officer gear to CCP for new bros simply worth more and for vets less. Bam isk for newbs. This creates an additional unnecessary artificial separation between the gear's actual value and its market value, and you want to minimize those artificialities wherever they don't serve a necessary purpose. In this case, your proposition only obliquely addresses the primary goal (reducing officer gear proliferation), and instead focuses on getting more ISK into newbros' hands, which isn't a goal of mine at all - it's only a tolerable side effect.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.21 23:52:00 -
[5] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:Gosh darn it I thought this was going to be a good discussion. We've already devolved to 'hurr durr can you even read?'
Yes. I read that you want the prices to go up. I don't think this is good for 2 reasons: 1. ISK is no longer an effective limiting factor. Too many people have gotten too rich off of too many broken mechanics. At the moment we don't have anything that really tests how much these people are willing to spend to get an advantage. Supply of officer weapons is far out-pacing demand and they're still selling at 200/300/500k a pop. So, 2. because we don't know how far the buyers are willing to go, there is a very real risk that this will just add yet another broken mechanic that puts far too much ISK into the hands of more established of players. And this is not just ISK changing hands either, it's coming direct from CCP so it's another ISK faucet. ISK faucets should NEVER be pegged to the player market.
I agree that having CCP buy the weapons back would technically pull them out of circulation, but the knock on effects of CCP having to compete with the player market would be disastrous. This is why Jadeks idea is so good, it pulls them out of circulation but it does it responsibly.
Come on, it's not really a good discussion until some mud's been slung, right? Don't worry, it washes off.
Jadek's idea is good in that it is a pure weapons sink with no artificial economic impact. Its efficacy is limited in that 1) it's not likely to appeal to all the stockpilers, and 2) it's not likely to significantly dent officer supply unless the SKIN costs are high enough that they're calculated to roughly offset the amount of officer weapons that were generated by warbarges.
That said, as I mentioned before, I think it's a good idea and should be implemented. But you're not going to appeal to those that want ISK, not a SKIN, or those who get their SKIN and still have a huge stockpile. So what else are we going to do?
As for your positing that 'there's nothing to test what people are willing to spend to get an advantage', I simply disagree. The market itself is currently showing exactly what people are willing to spend to get an advantage in the way of officer gear. If people are willing to spend more or less than the market's currently indicating, then that's just an indication of a poor market and it will tend to self resolve over time. If the market is perfect, meaning there's a perfect relationship and perfect communication between all buyers and all sellers, then it is completely irrelevant whether you give someone an officer weapon or a chunk of ISK; they are perfectly interchangeable on the market. This is what I mean when I say the "faucet" was already left on too long, and it's irrelevant that it was weapons pouring out rather than ISK - it's the same problem since there's a market for weapons<->ISK exchange. ISK proliferation is less of an evil than officer weapon proliferation, though, for reasons I've already touched on.
As for supply far outpacing demand, I don't have the stats and I think few people if anyone does, but I tend to this statement is a lot less likely to be true now that warbarge officer gear production has halted.
Ultimately you are right in that the artificial inflation cause by CCP's participation in the market as a preferred buyer is a necessary evil in my plan. I admitted this from the start. I still think it's a good idea, because (1) I just don't know any other way you're going to create an attractive weapons sink for those that don't give up their stockpiles for SKINS, and (2) the amount of evil is under CCP's direct control, in that they can directly control their price point above market (5%, 10%, whatever), in order to create a balanced, attractive, effective sink, after the success of which, they can pull back out, and, as I said, laissez faire economics can resume.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 02:56:00 -
[6] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:I think the crux of it is that we've both identified inflation as a problem caused by this system, but we don't agree on how severe that inflation will get. Nail on the head with your last statement. How bad will ISKflation be? We can't peg it with a monetary value yet (because we don't know the ISK<->weapon value relationship as it stabilizes in context of the recent supply change), but we CAN supply it with a DEFINITE and CONTROLLABLE value: it is the percentage that CCP offers over market. 5% over market? For every sale, you've created 5% inflation (relative to that purchase price, not the market as a whole!).
Expressing it in these terms prevents attributing to this issue any of the preexisting ISKflation issues already plaguing the Dustconomy, which are fairly left out of this discussion. By this I mean to exclude your concern that CCP has no control over the base price - this is true, but it's irrelevant: how high the prices go is already predetermined by the supply demand relationship recently established - all that's left is to wait for market lag to catch up. The real problem isn't the trivial inflation we're causing with this plan - it's the inflation that already exists. That's a bigger fish to fry, and it deserves its own treatment, which treatment is only trivially (like, 5% trivially) effected by this plan.
Also, don't be confused about my point RE: Isk/weapons out of thin air. I'm clear on a spigot with no drain being bad. My point is that, in our situation, nearly 100% of the value of officer weapons that were generated were "out of thin air" (after infrastructure costs), and this value is now irrevocably on the market, and whether it's in weapons form or isk form doesn't matter. My proposition to solve the problem costs an additional 5% "thin air" production. Is 5% really too high a proportionate cost?
Evaluating the inflation as a percentage also makes clear how trivially CCP can control their relationship to the plan. How much inflation is worth getting these weapons off the market (remembering that this inflation is, after all, progressive, benefiting the poor more than the rich (contrary to typical inflation))? Only if the answer to that question is "NONE, WE CAN SUFFER ABSOLUTELY NO ISKFLATION, THE IMBALANCE IT CAUSES FAR OUTWEIGHS THE IMBALANCE OF OFFICER WEAPONS IN THEIR CURRENT STATE" should my idea by discarded. That seems a hard position to espouse.
Otherwise, you just evaluate and adjust. Is the current rate working? Should we increase/reduce our margin in order to meet our goals? If CCP's got decent data collecting tools in place, then the metrics to keep a bird's eye view on this kind of thing, and turning the knobs appropriately to Keep It Working, should be very manageable.
You may be right about the value of hats. Dust is a long way from drawing the kind of attention you get on a platform like, say, TF2 or CS:GO where customization is much more deep and prominent. Ultimately, though, this is a question of personal taste in which the data will speak far more loudly than an opinion. So give it a whirl and see how people respond.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 03:14:00 -
[7] - Quote
All that theoretical language is really made so much clearer with a simple example:
Let's hypothesize that, after the dust() settles, and the market balances, an officer weapon ends up being worth 2 million ISK.
In this stocked and balanced market, a seller on the market trying to get 2.05 million ISK for an officer weapon is not going to make a sale. Why would a buyer pay 2.05 when the same gun's on sale right next to it for 2.00? Enter CCP with an buy offer of 2.05. Smart buyer isn't going to match this price, because in this perfect market, the officer weapon simply isn't worth 2.05. That 50,000 ISK is better spent elsewhere. And, on the other hand, smart seller isn't going to sell to anyone other than CCP, because it's a free 50,000 ISK from the invisible market.
This is the 'stabilization point', and at this point, CCP's higher buy price doesn't drive the market any higher - it is stable WITH the market at a 5% inflation point.
Net result? 50,000 inflationary ISK in seller's hands (5/100!), officer weapon off the market. Observe and adjust as necessary.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 03:18:00 -
[8] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote: Imagine the whole economy existed of 2 people. Person 1 has a weapon and 0 ISK, person 2 has 100 ISK and no weapon. Person 1 sells the weapon to person 2 for 100 ISK. Although the weapon has changed hands, there is still only 100 ISK in the economy. Person 2 can go out and get that weapon blown up or whatever, still only 100 ISK in the economy.
Now add a third person, CCP. Person 1 still has a weapon, person 2 still has 100 ISK. Person 1 wants to sell the weapon to person 2, but CCP steps in and says 'I'll buy it off you for 105 ISK with this money that never existed in the economy before.'
The weapon is gone, but that is inconsequential because there is now 205 ISK in the economy where there used to only be 100. It is not as simple as 'If CCP pays 5% extra that converts to 5% inflation' BECAUSE THEY'RE PAYING FOR IT WITH ISK THAT NEVER EXISTED
Can someone PLEASE help me out here?
I'm happy to help you out. Your example is flawed.
You're presuming over 100% inflation when there's only 5% inflation.
The economy prior to the transaction is 100ISK+1 weapon worth 100ISK = 200ISK. After CCP's intervention there is 100ISK + 105ISK = 205ISK. 5%, not over 100%.
Basic math here, Shaun.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 03:22:00 -
[9] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:Adding items to the game is not the same as adding currency
Here you're just plain wrong and that's where it where our discussion must end. If there's a liquid market between items and ISK, then the two are fungible and the format is irrelevant; value is value. If you can't understand this we can't proceed.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 03:46:00 -
[10] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:Byron Triefletcher wrote:Shaun Iwairo wrote:Adding items to the game is not the same as adding currency Here you're just plain wrong and that's where it where our discussion must end. If there's a liquid market between items and ISK, then the two are fungible and the format is irrelevant; value is value. If you can't understand this we can't proceed. From wikipedia: Fungibility refers only to the equivalence of each unit of a commodity with other units of the same commodity. Fungibility does not relate to the exchange of one commodity for another different commodity. Sean, you'll notice I specified "a liquid market".
In a liquid market, items can be exchanged without loss of value, making them equivalent commodities for fungibility purposes within that market.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 04:08:00 -
[11] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:it doesn't even matter bryon. ccp will never add that much isk into dusts economy. you know they hire an actual economist in eve to keep a handle on the sources and sinks of isk? they're not going to listen to some random on the forums who think's its a good idea to add in a source of isk that they won't even be in control of.
On the contrary, I hold out hope that sound ideas can make their way from any source to decision makers through communicative channels established at least in part for that very purpose.
I'm confident that the principles I've introduced here are economically sound, under the context of an analysis as to their actual ISK injection effects (which, I hope you've come to realize, is 5%, and not 105%), which can sit quite nicely along with other ISK injection factors, and doesn't in and of itself heavily offset the inflationary effects caused by other market affecting policies.
It's a shame you either can't or refuse to understand the principles of control that I tried (specifically for you) to explain above, in that CCP directly controls their buy offers on the market, and, thus, the inflationary effect of those buy offers, in terms of the only relevant metric there is: percentage of value.
I'm well within my element to offer sound economic policy advice, as will be immediately clear to anyone who engages in an informed discussion with me about the economic principles at hand; although, clearly, to someone not so informed, I may appear to just be another random on the forums.
You offered some valuable feedback before you went off the rails, and the spirit of your basic contentions are sound. I'm glad we had the exchange.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 05:04:00 -
[12] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:OK fair enough. Can we just try to hash out one last thing? CCP having control over the price vs not having control. We'll assume they're paying player market + 5%
Day 1: The asking price for a Bons is 100K isk, CCP are required to offer 105K. They buy a few, but a bunch still remain.
Day 2: I see that the asking price for a Bons is 105K, but I really want some. So I offer 106K and buy a few
Day 3: Market price for a Bons is now 106K, so CCP are required to offer 111.3K ISK. They buy a few, but a bunch still remain.
Day 4: I really want some more Bons, so I offer 120K ISK and buy a few.
Day 5: Market price for a Bons is now 120K ISK. CCP are required to offer 126K ISK. They buy a few, but a bunch still remain.
Day 5 (CCP night time): Market traders have worked out that the price is never going to go down, so a price war breaks out overnight as people scramble to buy as many as possible. By the morning, market price has reached 1M ISK. None have been removed from circulation because it's been traders buying them all up.
Day 6: CCP must now offer 1.05M ISK.
Did CCP, at any point, have control over how much they were offering outside of the small % on top of the market price?
Happy to play along.
Between Days 1 and 4 you introduce a new element to the purchasing equation: desire. On Day 2 you really want some, on Day 4 you have to really want some in order to pay the higher price.
This desire, in economic terms, is just a modifier of demand, and it's likely to trickle as the price goes up. Fewer people are likely to really want something than to merely really want something.
Trickling demand as price increases (which is natural) tends to slow price increase toward equilibrium, unless some other element is introduced.
So you introduced another element, at Day 5; speculative trading. Speculative trading is an other artificial injection of desire and demand in the market relationship at play; speculative value often differs substantially from actual value, as evidenced by the scores of day traders who fail on Wall Street every day. Speculative traders who assume prices will go up forever, and ignore the principle of trickling actual demand I mentioned earlier, will eventually fall victim to their hubris as they realize real buyers aren't willing to follow them up as high as they were willing to go. They lower their prices toward equilibrium, and eat losses, and the market stabilizes, or they stockpile their goods in hopes that market conditions will change down the road, and establish a degree of control over the market. Speculative investment is an independent (and extant) economic problem.
In other words, both of those injections you mentioned work their way, over time, toward an equilibrium in the market; an averaged demand that pulls average supply in order to generate an average market price over an average transactional delay.
We've said all this before, in fewer words, but sometimes repetition is the seed of communication.
Bottom line, to answer your question: Yes. At every single juncture, CCP controlled the amount over 'actual' market value that they offered in order to lure sellers away from private buyers and toward them. And at every juncture they had the ability to modify that amount downward in order to stem perceived inflation, or to modify it upward in order to increase their draw on suppliers.
Remember, also, that at EVERY JUNCTURE, assuming CCP keeps their incentive value at a flat 5%, then every buyer (except incorrect speculators) would be willing to pay 95.2% of that price absent CCP's participation. Absent speculation, if the market drives the price up to 1M per Bons, then that's the price the market will bear. And that might not be so far off the mark, since, as you've said, there have already been a number of market blunders putting a huge amount of ISK currently in circulation, and since Officer weapons are, ultimately, supposed to be rare.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 05:08:00 -
[13] - Quote
To clarify, when I say that 'speculative investment is an independent (and extant) economic problem', I don't mean to skirt that issue. I simply mean to draw your attention to the fact that this is already a problem that exists and will continue to exist in any market that allows it, including this one, with or without CCP's involvement.
With our without CCP's involvement in a buyback program, speculative investors are likely to drive the price upward in coming days/weeks as supply of Officer weapons dwindles in the face of decreased production. Indeed, they're likely to drive prices upward and downward to the extent that they're able to in the face of ANY event which they perceive likely to modify the market relationship in their favor. This is the nature of their trade.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
17
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 05:42:00 -
[14] - Quote
Shaun Iwairo wrote:OK cool cool, you mention equilibrium but that relies on a point existing at which profits are no longer possible, but your system guarantees that CCP will ALWAYS be willing to pay 5% extra than anyone else. Because of this, anyone that owned one the day before is guaranteed profits on the next day. A savvy trader will know that if they just let their stocks trickle out day after day for the guaranteed increasingly higher price they'll have an almost infinite source of ISK. The higher the price gets the slower they can release them because CCP's new ISK will just keep on increasing. Between the forces of traders looking for a profit, and CCP guaranteeing that profit, what would stop the price rising? I've tried to be clear about CCP's flexibility and analysis in terms of choosing an appropriate price point to add to the equation:
Quote:Once market supply is at an appropriate spot (i.e. officer weapons are rare again), CCP pulls out of the market and lets laissez faire economics take hold again. ...the amount of evil is under CCP's direct control, in that they can directly control their price point above market (5%, 10%, whatever), in order to create a balanced, attractive, effective sink, after the success of which, they can pull back out, and, as I said, laissez faire economics can resume. ...Evaluating the inflation as a percentage also makes clear how trivially CCP can control their relationship to the plan. How much inflation is worth getting these weapons off the market (remembering that this inflation is, after all, progressive, benefiting the poor more than the rich (contrary to typical inflation))? ...Otherwise, you just evaluate and adjust. Is the current rate working? Should we increase/reduce our margin in order to meet our goals? ...CCP directly controls their buy offers on the market, and, thus, the inflationary effect of those buy offers, in terms of the only relevant metric there is: percentage of value. ...And at every juncture they had the ability to modify that amount downward in order to stem perceived inflation, or to modify it upward in order to increase their draw on suppliers.
As for this:
Quote:Because of this, anyone that owned one the day before is guaranteed profits on the next day. A savvy trader will know that if they just let their stocks trickle out day after day for the guaranteed increasingly higher price they'll have an almost infinite source of ISK. The higher the price gets the slower they can release them because CCP's new ISK will just keep on increasing. Between the forces of traders looking for a profit, and CCP guaranteeing that profit, what would stop the price rising? As speculative buyers drive the prices higher, non-speculative buyers stop buying. This puts downward pressure on prices. Speculators see the price increases diminishing, and the more cautious among them thing they're near the end of their ride, and stop buying higher. This puts increased downward pressure on prices, and equilibrium is approached. This effect takes places whether or not CCP participates on the market. Also, if a single buyer/owner or consortium of buyer/owners has enough of a market share to artificially manipulate the market absent actual-buyer/user-buyer participation, then your economy has much much bigger problems than a 5% inflationary ISK faucet.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
Byron Triefletcher
Rebels New Republic The Ditanian Alliance
18
|
Posted - 2015.10.22 17:49:00 -
[15] - Quote
KGB Sleep wrote:All of this is WAY too much work for CCP. Whenever you want to bring a proposal to them you have to think of it in terms of work and how much you can squeeze out if it.
It seems like a lot of work, CCP monitoring an arms market and injecting ISK into an already overflowing bathtub. Nah, not hard. Make it automatic. Create an equation that sets CCP's offering at an amount above market that automatically tapers as the market price moves upward toward an amount that they've predetermined is appropriate.
If you don't like the artificiality of them predetermining the price ceiling, then apply a sine wave function to the offering price so that it periodically dips down below market, in order to evaluate how the market's responding to the current price absent their involvement, and have their price margin logarithmically decrease relative to those changes. OR, wait to implement the whole system until the market balances post-warbarge change, so that you have an appropriate baseline to start with.
After the equation's written and applied to the offering price, the whole thing's hands off, except to the extent that someone WANTS to monitor it.
KGB Sleep wrote:Keep CCP focused on developing and have the buyers battle each other.
Literally.
Vendor Officer gear for CP and let the raiding nightmare begin.
Create an incentive in the DK market that will inspire the PC community to grow and operate more frequently. I love these ideas. And I agree with you that the more attractive PC becomes, the more effective these would be. This is another independent issue: drawing people away from pubs and to PC. I've commented on this elsewhere, recently, and agree there should be a big push for this.
KGB Sleep wrote:So idk, but it was said that we needed more angles to approach the problem. The one that has the best chance for success will require the least amount of work. Ya, ease of implementation's definitely important.
Shaun Iwairo wrote:Fair call. You know who doesn't care about loyalty and would totally like getting some OP weapons? PIRATES! Blood Raider SKIN for smuggling weapons to them against to use against the Amarr, for those who didn't get the SKIN in the Crimson Harvest? Angel SKIN for hawking advanced weapon tech to them? This is good stuff.
Fighting for Matari Freedom.
|
|
|
|